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THE SINS OF THE FATHER VISITED UPON THE SONS
OF ANOTHER: INFECTIOUS UNENFORCEABILITY AND
CONSOLIDATED ALUMINUM CORP. v. FOSECO
INTERNATIONAL LTD.
INTRODUCTION
The defense of inequitable conduct is firmly ensconced in patent
law,' and when successfully pled, results in the unenforceability of
the patent-in-suit.2 Furthermore, inequitable conduct has long been
intertwined with the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands," with
courts frequently using the terms interchangeably. Courts have
used the doctrines of inequitable conduct and unclean hands to hold
that when a single patent-in-suit is tainted by inequitable conduct,
that conduct extends to related patents-in-suit, rendering them un-
enforceable.4 This doctrine, termed "infectious unenforceability,"
has been used by courts to invalidate groups of fraudulently ob-
tained patents,5 or patents stemming from a fraudulently obtained
parent application.6 However, before 1989, no cases of infectious
1. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985), overruled by Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollis-
ter, Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
2. See, e.g., Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
3. See, e.g., Precision Instruments Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806 (1945). The Court noted here that the petitioners claimed "Automotive possessed such 'un-
clean hands' as to foreclose its right to enforce the patents and the contracts." Id.
4. See, e.g., Armour & Co. v. Wilson & Co., 168 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. 11. 1958), afd in part,
274 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1960).
5. See Kevin R. Casey, "Infectious Unenforceability"." The Extent or Reach of Inequitable
Conduct on Associated Patents, 17 AIPLA Q.J. 338, 344 (1989) (stating that courts have held
that inequitable conduct tainting only one patent-in-suit also infects all associated patents-in-suit,
rendering them unenforceable).
6. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 1360, 1366 (D. Del. 1988)
(holding that a nexus between the inequitable conduct used to obtain the first patent and succes-
sive patents must exist to render associated patents unenforceable); Hemstreet v. Burroughs
Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1096, 1126 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (finding that the inequitable conduct used to
obtain one patent rendered the second sufficiently related patent unenforceable), affid in part, 861
F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also Boots Labs., Inc. v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 223 U.S.P.Q.
840, 849-51 (E.D. Va. 1984) (applying the inequitable conduct doctrine but finding a second
related patent enforceable).
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unenforceability had come before the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit.7
In Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco International Ltd.'
(Consolidated III), the Federal Circuit was presented with a case
involving infectious unenforceability. Consolidated III required the
Federal Circuit to consider for the first time the equitable maxim
"he who comes into equity must come with clean hands" to deter-
mine whether inequitable conduct in procuring one patent-in-suit re-
quires a holding that other patents-in-suit are unenforceable.9 The
court's affirmative answer to this question represented former Chief
Judge Markey's "last pronouncement" on inequitable conduct and
made clear that the doctrine of unclean hands is alive and well as a
basis for unenforceability. 10
Given the underlying facts of the case itself, and the sometimes
competing policies forming the basis of the patent system, the
court's decision in Consolidated III expanded the boundaries of pre-
vious lower court decisions and raised serious questions regarding
the scope and potential impact of its holding. At the very least, Con-
solidated further obfuscates the law of inequitable conduct, an area
that has long been notorious for swings and variances. 1
In Section I, this Note briefly traces the purposes behind the pat-
ent system and recounts the history and development of the doc-
trines of inequitable conduct and unclean hands. The Note, in Sec-
tion II, then examines the facts and issues presented in the subject
case, and how those facts and issues were viewed, first by the magis-
trate, then by the district court, and finally by the Federal Circuit.
Section III analyzes the Federal Circuit's opinion in light of prece-
dent and policy considerations. Section IV discusses the potential
impact of the court's holding on patent owners, inventors, and pat-
ent practitioners. Finally, this Note concludes that the holding in
Consolidated III is contrary to precedent, goes against public policy,
and, unless limited in future decisions, will have a negative effect on
the patent system.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1992), enacted in 1981, gives the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals from decisions in cases arising under the patent
laws.
8. 910 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Consolidated If).
9. Id. at 809.
10. Kenneth R. Adamo, Inequitable Conduct, 1990-91 ABA SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & COPY-
RIGHT L. ANN. REP. 229, 232.




A. The Patent System
The historical roots of the United States patent system can be
traced to the patent system originating in Great Britain. During the
sixteenth century, the English Crown began to grant "letters pat-
ents," giving individuals the exclusive right to produce, import, or
sell certain items within the kingdom. 2 The Crown often granted
such monopolies for commonplace items such as salt, vinegar, and
calfskins. 3 This practice led to widespread abuses, resulting in
shortages and inflated prices for items that would otherwise be read-
ily and cheaply available."4 After great public outcry, Parliament
passed the Statute of Monopolies, 15 prohibiting the Crown from cre-
ating monopolies in common items.'6 However, the statute contained
one exception; it permitted the Crown to grant patents, for a period
of fourteen years, to creators of new inventions.' 7 The rationale for
this exception was to encourage the creation of new inventions for
the benefit of society.' 8 The monopolies created by the Crown re-
strained trade in articles that had previously been part of the public
domain. By contrast, granting limited exclusive rights to an inven-
tion would not withdraw anything from the public; rather, it would
introduce something that is by definition new, and by implication
beneficial to societal progress.' 9 Coke characterized such grants as
being "good in law" since "the inventor bringeth to and for the
commonwealth a new manufacture by his invention, costs and
charges, and therefore it is reason that he should have a privilege
for his reward, (and the encouragement of others in the like) for a
convenient time. ' 12 0
Eager to continue such progress in the New World, colonies and
preconstitutional states continued to grant patents, some as early as
12. "Letters patents" comes from the Latin patentes, meaning "open" or "accessible." Thus,
letters patents were documents open for public examination. I WALKER ON PATENTS § 1, at 1-2
(Anthony William Deller ed., 1937).
13. 1 id. § 2, at 7.
14. 1 id. § 2, at 6.
15. An Act Concerning Monopolies and Dispensations with Penal Laws, and the Forfeitures
Thereof (Statute of Monopolies), 1623, 21 Jac., ch. 3; see also 3 GR. BRIT. STAT. AT LARGE 91.
16. 21 Jac., ch. 3; see also I WALKER ON PATENTS, supra note 12, § 5, at 18-21.
17. 21 Jac., ch. 3; see also 3 GR. BRIT. STAT. AT LARGE 91.
18. 1 ERNEST B. LIPSCOMB III, LIPSCOMB'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:6, at 34-38 (3d ed. 1984).
19. 1 id.
20. l id. § 1:5, at 34.
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the mid-seventeenth century.21 The same desire for progress eventu-
ally was expressed in the United States Constitution, which gave
Congress the power "To promote the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors,
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."2
This clause was adopted without debate. However, writing in The
Federalist Papers, James Madison observed:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of
authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of com-
mon law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to
the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims
of individuals.
23
Congress wasted no time in exercising this power following the
organization of our government; the First Congress passed the Pat-
ent Act of 1790 during its second session. 4 Despite major revi-
sions,25 the basic idea behind the system has remained the same: to
confer on the authors of useful inventions an exclusive right in their
inventions for the time set forth by law, in exchange for which their
inventions are disclosed to the public.26 "It is the reward stipulated
for the advantages derived by the public for the exertions of the
individual, and is intended as a stimulus to those exertions. 27
The ultimate goal of the patent system is to foster human pro-
gress by bringing new designs and technologies into the public do-
main through disclosure.2 8 In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, it
"is the interest and policy of every enlightened government" to en-
21. For a thorough discussion of the development of patent law, including early American pat-
ents, see George Ramsey, The Historical Background of Patents, 18 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 6 (1936).
22. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 271-72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
24. Patent Act, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790) (current version codified at 35 U.S.C. § 112
(1988)).
25. See Outline of the History of the United States Patent Office (no. 7, ch. 7), 18 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 63 (1936) (stating that the first patent act was short and comparatively simple).
26. The Patent Code sets out several disclosure requirements for would-be inventors:
Patent Code § 112 sets forth three distinct requirements for disclosure of inventions in
patent applications: (1) DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT - the invention that is
claimed must be the invention that is described; (2) the ENABLEMENT require-
ment - the description must be in such full, clear, and concise terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to make use of it; and (3) the BEST MODE requirement -
a description of the best embodiment of the invention known to the inventor at the
time of the patent application.
MCCARTHY'S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 103 (1991).
27. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 241-42 (1832).
28. Id. at 242.
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courage such progress. 9 The patent system, in effect, strikes a bar-
gain between inventors and the government - disclosure of the in-
vention in exchange for limited, court-enforced exclusivity. The
attractiveness of such a bargain, and its effectiveness in inducing
creative effort and disclosure of the results of that effort, depend
almost entirely on the backdrop of free competition in the exploita-
tion of inventions that are unpatented or of inventions with expired
patents.30
Writing in 1890, Professor William C. Robinson succinctly de-
scribed the essence of the patent system, stating:
The granting of a patent privilege at once accomplishes three important ob-
jects; it rewards the inventor for his skill and labor in conceiving and
perfecting his invention; it stimulates him, as well as others, to still further
efforts in the same or different fields; it secures to the public an immediate
knowledge of the character and scope of his invention, and an unrestricted
right to use it after it has expired. 1
The societal benefit of granting exclusive rights to inventors in
exchange for their disclosures has been recognized and lauded by
numerous commentators, ranging from Coke32  to Justice
O'Connor."3 A patent by its very nature is affected with a public
interest; it is an exception to the rule against monopolies and to the
right of access to a free and open market. 4 The far-reaching social
and economic consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a
paramount interest in seeing that a patent is free from fraud or
other inequitable conduct.3 The nature of the bargain between the
public and the inventor requires applicants before the patent office
to be held to a relationship of confidence and trust. 6 When an in-
ventor acquires a patent through a breach of this confidence and
trust, courts can use the principle of inequitable conduct to render
his patent unenforceable.3 7
29. Id. at 241.
30. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (opinion of
O'Connor, J.).
31. 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, ROBINSON ON PATENTS § 33 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co.
1890).
32. See supra text accompanying note 20 (characterizing grants of exclusive rights as "good
law").
33. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
34. Precision Instruments Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816
(1945).
35. Id.
36. Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 793 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
37. Id.
1992]
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B. Inequitable Conduct
From its inception, United States patent law has recognized that
a fraudulently acquired patent should not be enforced. The Patent
Act of 1790 provided for legal action to seek repeal of a patent "ob-
tained surreptitiously, or upon false suggestion."3 Early interpreta-
tions of this passage, and cases that followed, used common law
fraud as the standard for evaluating a patentee's conduct.39
The ultimate question of whether inequitable conduct has oc-
curred is not a question of law, but is equitable in nature. As an
equitable issue, inequitable conduct is committed to the discretion of
the trial court.40
Courts have been careful to distinguish inequitable conduct from
common law fraud."1 The Federal Circuit has characterized this dis-
tinction by noting that common law fraud requires: (1) misrepresen-
tation of a material fact; (2) intent to deceive or a state of mind so
reckless as to be the equivalent of intent; (3) justifiable reliance on
the misrepresentation by the party deceived, inducing him to act
thereon; and (4) injury to the party deceived, resulting from reliance
on the misrepresentation. 2
The Federal Circuit has also stated that inequitableconduct is
broader than "common law fraud" since inequitable conduct "en-
compasses affirmative acts of commission, e.g., submission of false
information, as well as omission, e.g., failure to disclose material
information. 43
Acts of commission are exemplified in Walker Process Equip-
ment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.44 There, the peti-
tioner alleged that the patentee submitted a declaration falsely stat-
ing that he neither knew nor believed that his invention had been in
public use in the United States for more than one year prior to filing
38. Patent Act, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (1790) (current version codified at 35 U.S.C. § 112
(1975)).
39. See, e.g., United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888).
40. Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
41. See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(stating that the "fraud" label can be confused with other conduct and that the inequitable con-
duct doctrine has a much broader reach), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985), overruled by Kings-
down Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
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its patent application. 5 The petitioner asserted that the patented
process had been in use more than one year before the filing date."
Remanding to the lower court, the Supreme Court held that the
patent-in-suit may have been illegal, and therefore unenforceable . 7
By contrast, acts of omission include such conduct as withholding
relevant information from the patent examiner during prosecution of
the application. This type of conduct was analyzed in Beckman In-
struments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc."" In this case, the Fifth Circuit
invalidated a patent, holding that the patentee's failure to disclose
the existence of relevant, published research in a related field consti-
tuted inequitable conduct. 9
However, merely showing that a patentee made false statements
or withheld relevant information in connection with the patent ap-
plication will not per se invalidate the patent. The party asserting
inequitable conduct as a defense must also show, by clear and con-
vincing evidence, a threshold degree of materiality and intent."
1. Materiality
Materiality can be established by any one of four tests: an objec-
tive "but for" test; a subjective "but for" test; a "but it may have
been" test; and a "substantial likelihood" test that is based on a rule
promulgated by the Patent and Trademark Office .5  The first of
these, the objective "but for" test, is satisfied when the misrepresen-
tation was so material that, but for the misrepresentation, the patent
not only would not have been issued, but should not have been is-
sued.5" Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery &
45. Id. at 174.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 177.
48. 428 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1970).
49. Id. at 566. The Beckman court further reasoned that the patentee made affirmative repre-
sentations that there was no such relevant published research. Id.
50. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559-60 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985), overruled by Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollis-
ter, Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
51. See American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir.) (de-
lineating and explaining each test), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); Plastic Container Corp. v.
Continental Plastics of Okla., Inc., 607 F.2d 885, 899 (10th Cir. 1979) (delineating the "but for"
and "but it might have been" tests), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980).
52. Swift Chem. Co. v. Usamex Fertilizers, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 29 (E.D. La. 1977);
Corning Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461, 469 (D. Del. 1966), af'd
in part, 374 F.2d 473, 479 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 826 (1967).
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Chemical Corp.53 illustrates the application of this test.
In Walker Process, the Supreme Court invalidated a patent-in-
suit on the ground that the patentee concealed the fact that the pat-
ent subject matter had been in public use for over one year.5" Ap-
plying the objective "but for" test, the Court first noted that the
Patent Act barred patentability of an invention that had been in
public use for over one year.55 It then reasoned that had the paten-
tee disclosed the previous public use of the subject matter in its ap-
plication, the patent would never have been granted.56
The second test is a subjective "but for" test, in which the misrep-
resentation causes the patent examiner to approve the application
when he or she would not otherwise have done so. 57 The court in
American Cyanamid Co. v. Federal Trade Commission58 used this
test. The patent at issue in American Cyanamid was directed to a
process for producing tetracycline, a common antibiotic.5 9 During
an interview with the examiner, the patentee's attorney stated that
one aspect of the claimed process was unknown in the antibiotics
field.60 Before issuance of the patent, the patentee discovered that
the process was known, but he failed to disclose this discovery to the
examiner. 6'
The Federal Trade Commission charged the patentee with ar-
ranging an illegal price-fixing scheme, alleging that the patentee
had committed inequitable conduct in acquiring the patent that
formed the basis of the scheme. 62 The Commission found the paten-
tee guilty of price-fixing, based in part upon its finding that the ex-
aminer allowed the patent on the basis of false statements made to
him by the patentee's attorney.63
The patentee appealed the Federal Trade Commission's decision
to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Although it reversed
the Commission's decision on other grounds, the court's analysis fo-
53. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
54. Id. at 181.
55. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1975)).
56. Id.
57. Waterman-Bic Pen Corp. v. W.A. Sheaffer Pen Co., 267 F. Supp. 849, 856 (D. Del. 1967).
58. 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
59. Id. at 778.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 762.
63. Id. (noting that the Commission had found that the patentees "fixed and maintained the
price of tetracycline in substantial markets through conspiracy and combination").
638 [Vol. 42:631
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cused not on the price-fixing issue, but on the question of whether
the patent examiner was intentionally deceived by the patentee, and
whether he issued the patent as a result of the deception.64
The third test, the "but it may have been" test, invalidates a pat-
ent if misrepresentation in the course of the patent prosecution
might have influenced the examiner.6" The court in Corning Glass
Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp. applied this test to a paten-
tee accused of submitting an affidavit containing false test results in
order to obtain a patent.66 The court held that under the "might
have been" test, the misrepresentation must be "relevant and signifi-
cant," stating that "if a false answer is given to the patent Exam-
iner when he asks 'How are you,' surely a false answer will not pre-
vent the enforcement of the patent."6
The court found that although the evidence at trial showed that
the tests forming the basis of the affidavit could have been per-
formed differently or more carefully, the defendant had failed to
prove that this constituted a misrepresentation that might have in-
fluenced the examiner."8
The fourth test was employed in American Hoist & Derrick Co.
v. Soiva & Sons Inc., 9 where the court adopted Patent and Trade-
mark Office (PTO) Rule 1.56(a).7" Rule 1.56(a) requires anyone
who is "substantially involved" in preparing or prosecuting a patent
application to disclose to the Patent Office any information that is
"material to the examination of the application." 17 ' The rule further
states that information is material where there is "a substantial like-
lihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in
64. Id. at 778.
65. Corning Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461, 470-71 (D. Del.
1966), affd in part, 374 F.2d 473 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 826 (1967).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 471 n.27.
68. Id. at 471.
69. 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
70. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1991), superseded by 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1992); see American Hoist &
Derrick, 725 F.2d at 1362. See generally Kenneth R. Adamo & Robert P. Ducatman, The Status
of the Rules of Prohibited Conduct before the Office: "Violation of the Duty of Disclosure" out
of "Inequitable Conduct" by "Fraud," 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y. 193 (1986) (dis-
cussing fraudulent patent applications before the Office); Kenneth R. Adamo, Recent Develop-
ments in Inequitable Conduct/The (Statutory) Duty of Disclosure/"Fraud" on the P.T.O., 73 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y. 110 (1991) (analyzing the evolution and current status of the
concept of inequitable conduct).
71. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1991), superseded by 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1992); see Adamo, supra
note 70, at I11.
1992]
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deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent. 72
According to the Federal Circuit, "the PTO standard is the appro-
priate starting point [in inequitable conduct analysis] because it is
the broadest and because it most closely aligns with how one ought
to conduct business before the PTO. ' 7 1 Under this standard, a refer-ence that would have been merely cumulative, teaching no more
than those references already considered by the examiner, would not
be material .7  Rule 1.56 is, by far, the most common ground used
for establishing materiality.7
The Rule 1.56(a) "substantial likelihood" test was applied in J.P.
Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd.,6 where the patentee had failed to
disclose to the examiner a pair of references that were subsequently
held to obviate certain claims of the patent in a re-issue proceed-
ing.77 In applying the Rule 1.56 standard, the Federal Circuit held
that the references were material since they would have been impor-
tant to a reasonable examiner in deciding whether to allow the
claims. 8
Each of the four tests for materiality requires the court to look to
the information that has been withheld in light of the claimed inven-
tion. The second prong of inequitable conduct, intent, focuses on the
72. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1991), superseded by 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1992).
73. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed..Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985), overruled by Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister,
Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
74. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1455-56 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(reversing the district court's holding of invalidity, reasoning that it relied on a merely cumulative
reference).
75. See generally Donald R. Chisum, Patent Law and the Presumption of Moral Regularity: A
Critical Review of Recent Federal Circuit Decisions on Inequitable Conduct and Willful In-
fringement, 69 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y. 27 (1987) (reviewing major Federal Circuit
decisions on inequitable conduct and willful infringement). Effective March 16, 1992, 37 C.F.R §
1.56 was amended to define information as "material" if:
(1) it establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, a prima facie
case of unpatentability of a claim; or
(2) it refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in:
(i) opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the Office, or
(ii) asserting an argument of patentability.
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1992).
As of this writing, no cases have been reported involving the new rule. It is therefore unknown
whether or not the courts will change the current materiality standard in light of the amendments
to PTO Rule 1.56. See Adamo, supra note 10 (presenting public commentary and debate on the
current amendments to Rule 1.56 shortly after they were proposed).
76. 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
77. Id. at 1562.
78. Id. at 1562-66.
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question of whether or not the patentee intended to act inequitably
in withholding material information. 9
2. Intent
A finding of inequitable conduct requires proof of a threshold
level of intent on the part of the patentee. 80 The challenging party
can meet this threshold level in a variety of ways.81 Intent may be
proved by acts, the natural consequences of which were presumably
intended by the actor. 8 Proof of deliberate scheming is not neces-
sary. 83 However, the involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evi-
dence, including evidence indicative of good faith, must indicate suf-
ficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive.84
The current standard for intent is illustrated in In re Harita,88 in
which a Japanese patent attorney was responsible for filing a United
States patent application corresponding to a Japanese application.
The attorney, unaware of the standards for disclosure in the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), withheld from the USPTO
the material references discovered during examination of the Japa-
nese application. In reversing the USPTO's finding of inequitable
conduct, the Federal Circuit stated:
"Inequitable conduct" is not, or should not be, a magic incantation to be
asserted against every patentee. Nor is that allegation established upon a
mere showing that art or information having some degree of materiality was
not disclosed. To be guilty of inequitable conduct, one must have intended to
have acted inequitably.86
The Japanese attorney, upon becoming aware of the duty to disclose
79. FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987). But see Adamo,
supra note 10 (commenting that courts will always find intent if materiality is present).
80. J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1560.
81. Id. (citing Hycor Corp. v. Schleuter Co., 740 F.2d 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
82. Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also American Hoist
& Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir.) (finding that intent may be
shown by any relevant degree. of proof), cert denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
83. Hycor Corp. v. Schleuter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that a show-
ing of gross negligence may also meet the threshold level of intent). Gross negligence is present
when the actor, judged as a reasonable person in his position, should have known of the material-
ity of the withheld reference. J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1560 (citing Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d
878, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
84. Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir.
1988), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
85. 847 F.2d 801 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
86. Id. at 808 (citing FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
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the withheld references, took steps to correct his mistake.8 7 In light
of this, the court found that the attorney's conduct did not rise to
the level of intent to mislead. 88
Once materiality and intent are established, the court must bal-
ance them to determine whether inequitable conduct has occurred."
Balancing is used to determine the presence or absence of inequita-
ble conduct, in view of all the circumstances. No single factor or
combination of factors can always be said to require an inference of
intent to mislead. Still, a patentee confronted with a high level of
materiality, along with clear proof that he knew or should have
known of that materiality, will find it difficult to establish "subjec-
tive good faith" sufficient to prevent the court from drawing an in-
ference of intent to mislead. 90
If, after balancing the evidence of materiality and intent, the
court finds inequitable conduct, it must hold that the patent claims
in issue are unenforceable. 9' This requirement must be distinguished
from situations not involving inequitable conduct; there, even if cer-
tain claims of a patent are held invalid, the remaining claims of the
patent can still remain valid and enforceable. 92 However, 35 U.S.C.
§ 288 expressly prohibits a patentee from 'filing an infringement ac-
tion to enforce a patent in which any one of its claims is invalid by
reason of fraud or deception.93 Thus, inequitable conduct with re-
spect to a patent-in-suit invalidates the entire patent, even if the
patent contains some valid claims. 94
The Federal Circuit has described the habit of charging inequita-
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1364 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
90. FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1987). It is this type of
balancing test, where the court weighs all of the evidence, that the court refers to in Kingsdown
Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1067 (1989).
91. Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 781 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
92. Cf Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 596 (7th Cir. 1971)
(holding that where no inequitable conduct is shown, the patentee may sue for infringement of
valid claims even if other claims of the patent are invalid), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972).
93. Section 288 states that "[wihenever, without deceptive intention, a claim of a patent is
invalid, an action may be maintained for the infringement of a claim of the patent which may be
valid." 35 U.S.C. § 288 (1975).
94. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985), overruled by Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister,
Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
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ble conduct in every major patent case as "a plague."95 Neverthe-
less, a charge of inequitable conduct is a potent defensive weapon
for an accused infringer and represents an equitable concept that
will remain a part of U.S. patent law for the foreseeable futureY6
C. Unclean Hands
Another equitable principle frequently invoked in patent cases is
the doctrine of unclean hands, which springs from the venerable ad-
age that "[h]e who comes into equity must come with clean
hands."97 The doctrine is a self-imposed ordinance that closes the
doors of a court of equity to one tainted with inequity or bad faith
relative to the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper the
behavior of the defendant may have been.98 It is rooted in the his-
torical concept of a court of equity as a vehicle for affirmatively
enforcing the requirements of conscience and good faith. 99 The doc-
trine presupposes a refusal of the court to be "the abetter of iniq-
uity." 100 Although equity does not demand that its suitors shall have
led blameless lives as to other matters, 101 it does require that they
shall have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as to the contro-
versy in issue.1°2
The principal patent cases in which the doctrine of unclean hands
comes to fore are Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co.,' 03
Precision Instruments Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Mainte-
nance Machinery Co.,104 and SSIH Equipment S.A. v. United
States International Trade Commission.0 5
Although Keystone Driller was decided in 1933, it is cited to this
day in patent cases involving inequitable conduct. 06 The case in-
95. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
96. See generally Adamo, supra note 70, at 112-16 (discussing the scope of the inequitable
conduct doctrine).




100. Bein v. Heath, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 228, 247 (1848).
101. Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 229 (1934).
102. Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933).
103. 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
104. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
105. 718 F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
106. Recent cases citing Keystone Driller in the context of inequitable conduct analysis include
Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l, Ltd., 910 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Texas Instru-
ments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 851 F.2d 342 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Builders Con-
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volved five patents, four of which were improvements on the subject
matter of the first patent."0 7 The patentee concealed a prior use that
would have invalidated one of the improvement patents. After
bringing suit to enforce all five of the patents, the patentee con-
spired to suppress evidence of the prior use from the trial court.'08
The Supreme Court upheld the Sixth Circuit ruling that all five
patents-in-suit were unenforceable due to unclean hands. However,
the Court based its holding not on the patentee's concealment of
prior use from the Patent Office, but on the suppression of evidence
from the trial court. It stated that unclean hands applies "only
where some unconscionable act of one coming for relief has immedi-
ate and necessary relation to the equity that he seeks in respect of
the matter in litigation."'' 09
In Precision Instruments, the inventor submitted a false affidavit
in order to prevail in an interference proceeding, 110 thereby ob-
taining a patent.'' The assignee of the patent subsequently sued for
infringement on the perjured patent and two others, notwithstanding
its discovery of the inventor's perjured affidavit." 2 The Supreme
Court stated that the history of the patents in issue was "steeped in
perjury and undisclosed knowledge of perjury,"113 and citing Key-
stone Driller as persuasive support, dismissed the entire suit under
the unclean hands doctrine.""
SSIH Equipment involved a complaint filed before the Interna-
tional Trade Commission (ITC) alleging infringement of three U.S.
patents directed to stadium scoreboards.1 5 Initially, the ITC deter-
crete, Inc. v. Bremerton Concrete Prods. Co., 757 F.2d 255 (Fed. Cir. 1985); National Presto
Indus., Inc. v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 760 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Il1. 1992); Trilogy Communi-
cations, Inc. v. Comm Scope Co., 754 F. Supp. 468 (W.D.N.C. 1990).
107. Keystone Driller, 290 U.S. at 246.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 245.
110. An interference proceeding is an administrative proceeding before the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences to determine which of two or more inventors was the first to invent and
therefore is entitled to a patent. Each inventor seeks to prove priority of invention, that is, that he
was the first inventor of the technology common to all contesting inventors. The underlying princi-
ple of an interference proceeding is that two patents must not be granted on the basis of only one
inventive concept arrived at by each contesting inventor. MCCARTHY'S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 168 (1991).




114. Id. at 819.
115. SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 367 (Fed. Cir.
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mined that all three of the patents were valid and barred importa-
tion of the infringing scoreboards. Subsequently, two of the patents
were asserted in a separate infringement action in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Michigan and were held invalid due to inequitable conduct.
The remaining patent issued before the filing of the patents involved
in the infringement action and was not at issue in the infringement
action.' 16
When ITC became aware of the district court decision, it modi-
fied its exclusion order to suspend the portion of its order referring
to the unenforceable patents, while maintaining the order on the ba-
sis of the third patent. The importer appealed to the Federal Cir-
cuit." 7 Invoking Keystone Driller, the importer asked the court to
refuse to enforce the third patent, arguing that all of the patents
were so interrelated that the patentee's unclean hands with respect
to the first two patents rendered the third patent unenforceable."18
The Federal Circuit upheld the ITC modification, noting that the
inequitable conduct had occurred after the patent-in-suit had issued
and almost three years before the other patents were applied for.
The court also cited the absence of a sufficient relationship between
the patent-in-suit and the inequitable conduct in the related patents.
The court rejected the importer's reliance on Keystone Driller, stat-
ing that Keystone Driller and its progeny would deny enforcement
of the third patent only if the patentee were to have committed a
fraud on the Commission itself." 9
Keystone Driller, Precision Instruments, and SSIH Equipment il-
lustrate how courts have applied the concepts of equity, specifically
the doctrine of unclean hands, to patent cases. These cases demon-
strate that courts have the power to render several patents unen-
forceable. The following section details the efforts of courts to strike
a balance between this power and the constitutional policies under-
lying the patent system - policies which favor patents as a mecha-
nism for encouraging scientific progress by rewarding inventors with
1983).
116. Id. at 368.
117. Id. at 369. Note that SSIH Equipment did not present the Federal Circuit with a clear-
cut case of infectious unenforceability since the alleged inequitable conduct occurred in the prose-
cution of patents not in suit.
118. Id. at 378.
119. Id. at 379 (citing as an example Armour & Co. v. Wilson & Co., 168 F. Supp. 353 (N.D.
II1. 1958), affd in part, rev'd in part, 747 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1960)).
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exclusive patent rights. 120
D. Infectious Unenforceability - Balancing Equitable Power
and Patent Policy
The term "infectious unenforceability" has been coined to define
the holding reached by some courts in applying the doctrines of in-
equitable conduct and unclean hands to render multiple patents-in-
suit unenforceable due to an inequitable act committed with respect
to at least one, but less than all, of the patents.' In applying the
precepts of infectious unenforceability, courts have held that if a
single patent-in-suit were tainted by inequitable conduct, then that
conduct "infected" associated patents-in-suit and rendered them un-
enforceable also.' 22
The potential impact of infectious unenforceability on the patent
system has been considered in the patent literature. 23 However,
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc.124 is among the few
cases that expressly address the balance struck between the policy
purposes of the patent system and the doctrines of inequitable con-
duct and unclean hands. Procter & Gamble involved three patents
120. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23 (discussing the Framers' intent with respect to
patent law).
121. See generally Casey, supra note 5, at 344-45 (discussing the evolution of the "infectious
unenforceability" doctrine).
122. Id. (explaining the concept of infectious unenforceability).
123. See id. at 359. Casey gives the following exemplary scenarios, which bear striking resem-
blance to the situation presented in Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 910 F.2d
804 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Consolidated I1):
For example, consider the plaintiff who has obtained two patents by assignment,
with one patent tainted by inequitable conduct and the other patent free of taint, and
who sues for infringement of both patents. The tainted patent issued through abuse of
PTO procedures and must be refused enforcement to protect those procedures. To
hold the untainted patent unenforceable, however, would punish the assignee unduly.
Moreover, such a holding would not protect the PTO procedures because the un-
tainted patent issued without abusing those procedures. Therefore, the procedures
need no protection.
Moreover, consider the situation where a patentee has obtained two patents, one of
them (only) through inequitable conduct before the PTO. It might be argued, of
course, that PTO procedures would be more fully protected if both the Patentee's
patents were held unenforceable under a theory of infectious unenforceability. In view
of the high duty-low misconduct standard, however, the severe penalty already im-
posed (forfeiture of rights under a patent) should be punishment enough to protect
the PTO's procedures. The additional penalty of forfeiting additional patent rights is
unnecessary.
Casey, supra note 5, at 359-60; see infra notes 256-58 and accompanying text (detailing the
relationships between the patents-in-suit in Consolidated III).
124. 697 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Del. 1988).
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directed to the manufacture of dual-textured cookies. The accused
infringers asserted that inequitable conduct in obtaining two of the
patents rendered the third patent unenforceable since the patents
were "connected. 12 5
Despite the fact that the patents were directed to the same sub-
ject matter, 1 6 the court found that the patents were mutually inde-
pendent, stating that "whether [one of the first patents] is unen-
forceable or not has little bearing on the validity of what it teaches.
The independent source of an additional method of production [in
the third patent] makes any 'connection' extremely attenuated.' 2 7
With respect to the concept referred to here as "infectious unen-
forceability," the court stated:
The Court has serious reservations about whether one patent could ever in-
corporate, along with the teachings of another patent, the inequitable con-
duct associated with another patent. Even if the incorporated patent is ulti-
mately unenforceable, the teachings of that patent are still available as
information within the public domain. Subsequent inventors should be able
to rely on those teachings without having to worry about incorporating the
misdeeds underlying the incorporated patent's unenforceability. 12 8
A factually similar case, Boots Laboratories, Inc. v. Burroughs
Wellcome Co.,' 2 9 was an action for declaratory judgment involving
two patents directed to compounds and methods for treating condi-
tions that lead to gout. Upon finding that someone other than the
named inventor had actually discovered the patented compound, the
patent owner dedicated the compound patent to the public, while
maintaining the method patent in force. 130
The plaintiff asserted that the patentee knew of the previous dis-
covery of the compound at the time the method application was filed
but failed to disclose this knowledge to the Patent Office.' 3' The
plaintiff argued that this failure constituted inequitable conduct in
125. Id. at 1362.
126. The third patent incorporated by reference one of the allegedly "tainted" patents, and the
claims of the patents overlapped to such an extent that they were later the subject of a terminal
disclaimer which restricted the term of the later patents so that all three patents would expire at
the same time. Id. at 1364-65.
127. Id. at 1363.
128. Id. at 1363 n.7.
129. 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 840 (E.D. Va. 1984).
130. Id. at 846. A method or process claim is a claim of a patent that covers a method by
defining a series of steps to be followed in performing a process. A process claim is to be con-
trasted with a product claim or apparatus claim, which covers a structure, apparatus, or composi-
tion. MCCARTHY'S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 263-64 (1991).
131. Boots Labs., 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 845.
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procuring the compound patent, rendering both the compound pat-
ent and the method patent invalid.'32
The district court upheld the validity of the patent-in-suit, stating
that it did not need to reach the issue of whether or not fraud oc-
curred in the procurement of the compound patent. It stated:
Even assuming that the [compound] Patent was, as plaintiff alleges, ob-
tained through fraud, the [method] Patent is not thereby invalidated. Courts
will not invalidate a patent because a prior patent has been fraudulently
obtained unless there is some causal connection between the validity of the
two patents. . . . The validity of the [method] Patent is not dependent upon
the validity of the [compound] Patent. Whether or not the compound . . . is
itself a patentable invention, the use of [the compound] in the treatment of
gout is valuable and patentable in its own right. The alleged fraud . . . ex-
tends only to the issue of inventorship of the compound, not to its various
uses. The validity of the [compound] Patent would not have been considered
relevant by a reasonable patent officer in deciding whether or not to grant
the [method] Patent.'
Procter & Gamble and Boots Laboratories present examples of
district courts weighing the beneficial effects of the patent system
against the need for ensuring candor before the United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Office. In these cases, the courts found two con-
ditions that must be present in order to use inequitable conduct in
procuring one patent as the basis for invalidating a related patent.
First, there must be a significant relationship between the first pat-
ent and the second patent. 34 Second, there must be a significant
relationship between the inequitable conduct in the first patent and
the validity of the second patent. 3 5
Another case balancing these competing interests is Hemstreet v.
Burroughs Corp.,' 6 in which the court found that such significant
relationships existed. In Hemstreet, the examiner had required re-
striction between two inventions in a single patent application. The
applicant elected to prosecute one of the inventions in the original
application and filed a divisional application to prosecute a second
invention. As a result, two patents were issued from the original ap-
plication.'3 7 However, the applicant had failed to disclose relevant
132. Id. at 849.
133. Id. at 849-50.
134. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text (discussing the Procter & Gamble case).
135. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text (discussing the Boots Laboratories case).
136. 666 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. III. 1987).
137. Id. at 1107.
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prior art 3 ' in prosecuting the original application.'3 9
The district court found that the undisclosed prior art was highly
material to the claims of both patents-in-suit, that the patentee
knew of the materiality of the prior art, and that he failed to call it
to the attention of the Patent Office. This failure to disclose consti-
tuted inequitable conduct rendering both of the patents
unenforceable. 40
Unlike the patents in Procter & Gamble and Boots Laboratories,
the patents in Hemstreet were closely related; both patents stemmed
from the same original application. In further contrast to the pat-
ents in Procter & Gamble and Boots Laboratories, the genealogical
relationship 4 ' between the patents-in-suit in Hemstreet rendered
the misrepresentation highly material to the claims of both patents.
Thus, despite countervailing policy considerations, the Hemstreet
court had no choice but to invalidate both patents-in-suit.
In deciding the three cases discussed in this section, the district
courts used varying terminology in describing the relationships be-
tween patents-in-suit that would necessitate application of the infec-
tious unenforceability doctrine. However, the standards for such ap-
plication are consistent: In order to render related patents
unenforceable, the patents must either have a genealogical relation-
138. The term "prior art" refers generally to "that fund of information which is available or
accessible to the public." I PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 7.01 (2d ed.
1992).
139. Hemstreet, 666 F. Supp. at 1106.
140. Id. at 1107.
141. Kevin Casey provides a concise definition of "genealogically related":
When an applicant files a subsequent patent application (the "child") before the pat-
enting, abandonment, or termination of proceedings on an earlier-filed application
(the "parent") by the same inventor, co-pending applications exist. There are three
types of co-pending, genealogically related applications. First, the child application
may disclose and claim only the invention disclosed and claimed in the parent applica-
tion. Such a child is a continuation application. Second, a continuation-in-part child
application includes at least part of the parent application's disclosure and includes
subject matter which was not part of [the parent's] disclosure. Finally, the child ap-
plication may claim only a portion of the subject matter disclosed in the parent appli-
cation. This third type of co-pending application is a divisional application. Under 35
U.S.C. § 120 (1982), a child application may receive the benefit of the parent's ear-
lier filing date [for subject matter common to the parent and child].
Casey, supra note 5, at 354; see U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAM-
INING PROCEDURE § 201.11 (1989), reprinted in 10 ERNEST B. LIPSCOMB III, LIPSCOMB'S
WALKER ON PATENTS 38 (rev'd ed. 1990).
For examples of cases in which courts have used the parent-child terminology, see Indiana Gen.
Corp. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 408 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1968); Chemithon Corp. v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 287 F. Supp. 291, 299 (D. Md, 1968), affd per curiam, 427 F.2d 893 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
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ship or there must be a causal connection between the validity of the
patents. With these district court cases as a backdrop, Consolidated
Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco International Ltd. 42 presented the Fed-
eral Circuit with an issue of first impression - whether the equita-
ble maxim "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands"
required it to hold related patents-in-suit unenforceable when one
patent-in-suit was procured by inequitable conduct. 14 However,
before reaching the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the
facts and issues presented in Consolidated III were scrutinized at
trial before a federal magistrate, as well as by Senior Judge Hubert
L. Will of the district court.
II. CONSOLIDATED ALUMINUM CORP. V. FOSECO INTERNATIONAL
LTD.
A. The Magistrate's Findings
44
By agreement of the parties, the initial trial in Consolidated was
held before United States Magistrate Elaine Bucklo. 145 Consoli-
dated was an enormous case, even by patent litigation standards.
The initial trial took six weeks, involved more than two thousand
physical exhibits and documents, and elicited testimony from
twenty-seven in-court witnesses and seventy witnesses by deposi-
tion. 46 The magistrate's "Report and Recommendations" was
ninety-four pages long.4 7 Consequently, a complete understanding
of the Consolidated case requires some preliminary exposition of the
technology involved in the patents-in-suit and of the business deal-
ings of the parties.
1. The Technology
The patents-in-suit at issue in Consolidated concerned the use of
a ceramic foam filter to remove impurities, in the form of entrained
solids, from a fluid pour of molten metal. The patents were directed
to the filters themselves, to methods of using the filters, and to
methods of manufacturing the filters.148
142. 910 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
143. Id. at 809.
144. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1143 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (Consolidated I).
145. Id. at 1144-45.
146. Id. at 1145-46.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1145.
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Molten metal, particularly molten aluminum, generally contains
impurities which may be deleterious to the final cast product. The
impurities appear as inclusions in the final cast product after the
molten aluminum solidifies and may cause the product to be less
ductile, or to have poor bright finishing and anodizing characteris-
tics. Consequently, manufacturers want to remove as many impuri-
ties from the molten aluminum as practicable before casting their
final products.14 9
Prior to the development of the ceramic foam filter, the conven-
tional techniques for filtering impurities from molten aluminum in-
cluded passing the molten aluminum through open weave glass cloth
screens, through bed filters of tabular alumina, or through flux-
coated alumina balls. 150 By the 1970s, the ball filter was considered
the commercial frontrunner in the industry.' 5' However, a need ex-
isted for a different kind of filter which could provide the desired
molten metal quality by a cheaper and easier method.152
In the early 1970s, the Olin Corporation (Olin) had an extensive
aluminum producing operation, using the ball filter in its production
methods.' 53 At that time, Dr. Michael J. Pryor was Director of the
Metal Research Laboratories (MRL) division of Olin, and was
aware of reports of the shortcomings of conventional filters. 54 In the
summer of 1972, Dr. Pryor visited Dr. Thomas J. Gray, a faculty
member at Alfred University in New York, and investigated a small
piece of ceramic material that Dr. Gray had brought with him. 55
During this meeting, it occurred to Dr. Pryor that an open cell ce-
ramic foam material might be made and used as a disposable filter
for molten aluminum or copper, and he discussed this possibility
with Dr. Gray. 50
Upon his return to MRL, Dr. Pryor prepared a Memorandum Of
Invention (memorandum) setting down the concepts that he had dis-
cussed with Dr. Gray.' 57 At the time, Dr. Gray believed that ce-
149. Id. at 1146 (describing the impurities appearing in molten metal, the effect of these impu-
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ramic foam could act as a metal filter if it were made out of ceramic
materials that did not use binders, since he believed that binders
would be attacked by molten aluminum or copper, thus disintegrat-
ing the filter.158 Therefore, Dr. Pryor contacted Dr. Gray and asked
him to try to make a ceramic foam body that did not contain
binders.159
Having heard nothing from Dr. Gray by the spring of 1973, Dr.
Pryor asked. James E. Dore, the head of the Process Metallurgy
Section at MRL, to take over the project. 160 Dore assigned various
researchers to the task and in June of 1973, formulated a slurry that
contained the binder Bentonite, known as the "CS1-B" slurry.' In
November of 1973, Olin conducted pilot tests that showed the feasi-
bility of using the ceramic foam filter, made from the CS 1-B slurry,
in producing cast aluminum. 62
2. Parties to the Consolidated Litigation
a. The plaintiffs
Plaintiff Swiss Aluminum Ltd. (Alusuisse) purchased the alumi-
num operation of Olin for assignment to its subsidiary, plaintiff
Consolidated Aluminum Corporation (Consolidated). The purchase
was effective January 4, 1974 and provided for grantback licenses to
Olin for any patent or patent application relating to the aluminum
field filed prior to that date.'63 Dr. Pryor wanted the ceramic foam
filter to be one of the developments Olin would be free to use follow-
ing the buy-out, should the filter become commercially viable. He
instructed Olin's patent attorney to immediately prepare and file a
patent application based on his memorandum.6 4 The application
was filed on January 2, 1974, two days before the "grant-back"
deadline. The application disclosed the binderless slurry formula en-
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1149.
161. Id. A slurry is a watery mixture or suspension of insoluble matter. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2148 (1986).
162. Consolidated I, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149.
163. Id. The grantback deadline was thus the purchase date, January 4, 1974, and the applica-
tion was filed two days before the deadline, on January 2, 1974. Id. A grantback license is a
provision in a patent license by which the patentee-licensor requires that the licensee assign or
license back to the licensor patent rights on improvements developed by the licensee during the
term of the license. MCCARTHY'S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 146 (1991).
164. Consolidated 1. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1149-50.
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visioned by Dr. Pryor and Dr. Gray in the memorandum, 6 5 but in-
cluded the November 1973 test results, performed with the CS1-B
slurry, which contained binders. 6 Believing that future patents
would be directed to specific slurry formulas, Dr. Pryor instructed
his patent attorney to include the sentence: "Additives may be em-
ployed in the slurry such as binders.116 7 This application issued on
July 8, 1975 as U.S. Patent No. 3,893,917 (the 917 patent), entitled
"Molten Metal Filter. 1 68
After purchasing Olin's aluminum operation, Consolidated con-
tinued, over the ensuing four years, to develop various aspects of the
use and manufacture of the ceramic foam filter.'6 9 Consolidated di-
rected its efforts to developing manufacturing techniques for pro-
ducing ceramic bodies with consistent structure, to identifying and
enhancing advantageous structural properties of ceramic filters, and
to developing mounting arrangements for ceramic filters.1 70 This
work was done for Consolidated under the direction of James Dore
at MRL.171
In order to protect some of their developments in these areas,
Consolidated obtained several United States patents, all of which
named James Dore, John Yarwood, and Robert Preuss of MRL as
coinventors.171 U.S. Patent No. 3,962,081, entitled "Ceramic Foam
Filter" (the 081 patent), which issued on June 8, 1976, was directed
to a ceramic foam filter having pore blockages, structures which
cause molten metal poured through the filter to travel a tortuous
path.' 73 U.S. Patent No. 4,024,056, entitled "Filtering of Molten
Metal" (the 056 patent), which issued on May 17, 1977, and U.S.
Patent No. 4,081,371, entitled "Filtering of Molten Metal" (the 371
patent), which issued on March 28, 1978, concerned the use of a
removable filter plate. 7" U.S. Patent No. 4,024,212, entitled "Ce-
ramic Foam and Method of Preparation" (the 212 patent), which
issued on May 17, 1977, was a continuation of the 081 patent and
165. Id. at 1153.
166. Id. at 1149.
167. Id. at 1153.
168. Id. at 1145.
169. Id. at 1150.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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claimed a method for making filters with pore blockages.175 U.S.
Patent No. 4,075,303, entitled "Method of Preparation of Ceramic
Foam" (the 303 patent), which issued on February 21, 1978, was
also a continuation of the 081 patent and was directed to the use of
rollers in preparing ceramic foam filters. 176 These patents, along
with the 917 patent, were the patents-in-suit in the Consolidated
case.
b. The defendants
The Refractories Division of defendant Foseco International Ltd.
(Foseco)'" began developing ceramic foam filters in 1969.178 After
several years of research and experimentation, Foseco Refractories
(Refractories) had not yet developed a commercially viable filter.' 79
From 1975 through 1977, officials from Refractories held several
meetings with officials from British Aluminum Company (British
Aluminum), during which time the parties discussed the Consoli-
dated ceramic foam filter patents.180 British Aluminum asked
Refractories to provide a similar ceramic foam filter system to that
manufactured by Consolidated. As a result, in 1977, Refractories
began manufacturing ceramic foam filters for sale to Rolls Royce. 181
Foseco disbanded Refractories in 1978.182 However, the Product
Manager for Foseco Foundry Division (Foundry) had heard of
Refractories' ceramic foam filter projects, and he assigned techni-
cians to begin work on a similar ceramic filter system. 8 Despite
intense experimentation, their efforts were unsuccessful until an Oc-
tober 1978 meeting took place between Foundry technicians and
former Refractories employees who had been involved in Refracto-
ries' ceramic foam project. Once again, the parties discussed the
Consolidated ceramic foam filter patents. Shortly after this meeting,
the Foundry technicians, using Consolidated's patented technology,
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1145-50.
177. Foseco Minsep PLC is a British parent company of Foseco Inc. (a U.S. sales arm of
Foseco Minsep) and Foseco International Ltd. (a research arm of Foseco Minsep and sister com-
pany of Foseco Inc.). Id. at 1144. For the sake of simplicity, this Note uses the term "Foseco"
interchangeably to designate all of these corporate entities.
178. Id. at 1150.







developed a slurry formula and manufacturing technique for pro-
ducing ceramic foam filters, which Foseco sold under the tradename
"SIVEX. 1 84
Consolidated accused Foseco of infringing on Consolidated's pat-
ents through its manufacture of these ceramic foam filters. 185 Addi-
tionally, Consolidated accused several of Foseco's customers of in-
fringing activity.186 Defendant Alumax Mill Products Inc. (Alumax)
was a Consolidated customer until 1981, after which it began buy-
ing SIVEX filters from Foseco.' 87 Defendant Trialco Inc. (Trialco)
bought filters from both Consolidated and Foseco.' 88
3. The Complaint and Answer
Foseco was charged 'with direct, joint, and/or contributory in-
fringement, or with inducing infringement, of the 917, the 081, the
056, the 371, the 212, and the 303 patents by its activities in pro-
ducing and selling its SIVEX filter.' 89 Foseco also was charged with
willful infringement of all of the patents-in-suit. 90
Defendants Alumax and Trialco were charged with direct in-
fringement of the 081 patent by using the SIVEX filter to filter mol-
ten aluminum.1 ' Alumax and Trialco were also charged with direct
infringement of the 056 and the 371 patents by using the SIVEX
filter to practice the method and molten metal filter system claimed
in those patents.'92
Alumax and Trialco denied all allegations of infringement and
further counterclaimed that the patents-in-suit were invalid and un-
enforceable. 93 Foseco alleged that: (1) Consolidated and Alusuisse
had conspired and acted in bad faith by commencing the lawsuit
and circulating warnings of patent infringement to Foseco's custom-
ers; (2) the patents were procured by Consolidated as a result of
fraud upon the Patent Office; and (3) Consolidated had violated an-
titrust laws by illegally tying the sale of its filters to its filter bowls
184. Id.




189. Id. at 1145.
190. Id.
191. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 173 (discussing the content of the 081 patent).
192. Consolidated 1, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145; see supra text accompanying note 174
(discussing the contents of the 056 and the 371 patents).
193. Consolidated 1, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1145.
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and by using their buying power over Foseco products to coerce
Foseco to abandon the ceramic foam filter market. 94
Consolidated and Alusuisse denied all of the allegations in the
counterclaims brought by Foseco, Alumax, and Trialco."'9
4. The Trial
The district court ordered the trial bifurcated, with the liability
and willfulness issues to be tried first, and a trial on damages to
follow if liability was found. On agreement of the parties, the liabil-
ity portion of the trial was held before Special Master Elaine E.
Bucklo, the federal magistrate who had overseen most of the discov-
ery in the case. 9
After six weeks of trial involving more than two thousand physi-
cal exhibits and documents, and testimony from twenty-seven in-
court witnesses and seventy deposition witnesses, Magistrate Bucklo
arrived at the following findings. First, various claims of Consoli-
dated's 917, 081, 056, 371, 212, and 303 patents were obvious from
or anticipated from the prior art, and were therefore invalid.'97
Second, all of the 917 claims were invalid for failure to disclose
the best mode 9 8 contemplated by the inventors. 199  Magistrate
Bucklo held that the evidence showed that the best mode known at
the time Consolidated filed the 917 application was the CS1-B
slurry. This best mode was later disclosed and claimed in Consoli-
dated's 363 patent, which was not in suit. 00 Instead of disclosing
the actual slurry used to make the filters, Magistrate Bucklo found
that the 917 patent disclosed a "fictitious, inoperable" slurry (the




197. Id. at 1152-58. This prior art involving ceramic foam filters was the subject of U.S. Patent
No. 3,090,094 ("094"), issued in 1963 to Dr. Karl Schwartzwalder. Dr. Pryor, who assisted in
developing the subject matter of the Consolidated patents, knew of the 094 patent as far back as
1972. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 163-76 (discussing the evolution of the Consolidated
patents).
198. See DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1985). There, the court held
that 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) requires a patent specification to "set forth the best mode contem-
plated by the inventor of carrying out the invention." The DeGeorge court further explained that
the purpose of the best mode requirement is to "restrain inventors from applying for patents while
at the same time concealing from the public preferred embodiments of their invention which they
have in fact conceived." Id.
199. Consolidated 1, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
200. Id. at 1153.
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dients necessary to hold the ceramic together.2 1'
The evidence further showed that both inventors of the 917 patent
knew that the example disclosed in the 917 patent was inoperative
and not the best mode and knew that the CS1-B slurry of the 363
patent was the best mode used to make the filters that were actually
tested as reported in the 917 patent. Dr. Pryor's testimony reflected
his knowledge that the CSB-1 slurry was not going to be disclosed
because he instructed his patent attorney to add the sentence to the
917 specification stating: "Additives may be employed in the slurry
such as binders." Inclusion of this sentence would have been unnec-
essary if the CS1-B slurry had been disclosed. 202
Based on Consolidated's failure to disclose the best mode as re-
quired by 35 U.S.C. § 288, Magistrate Bucklo concluded that the
917 patent was invalid and unenforceable:
The evidence supports the inference that the withholding of the best mode
and inclusion of a fictitious slurry was intentional. Had the Examiner known
that the best mode had been withheld, the 917 patent application would not
have been allowed to issue under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Thus, the intentional
withholding of the best mode represents inequitable conduct in connection
with the prosecution of the 917 patent."'3
Foseco also alleged that claim 1 of the 081 patent would have
been invalid if the CS1-B slurry, as disclosed in the 363 patent,
would have been available as prior art (i.e., disclosed in the 917
patent).2"4 Magistrate Bucklo dismissed this argument, stating, "As-
suming that these patents are indeed prior art as to the 081 patent,
I conclude that they do not affect the validity of Claim 1.205
The magistrate also found that: claims 1, 4, 5, and 9 of the 081
patent were valid and willfully infringed by Foseco; claims 1, 2, and
18 of the 212 patent were valid and willfully infringed by Foseco;
claim 1 of the 303 patent was valid and willfully infringed by
Foseco; Alumax and Trialco were liable as infringers of the 081 pat-
ent; and all defendants had failed to prove their- antitrust
counterclaims.206
201. Id. at 1167; see supra text accompanying note 157 (discussing the contents of the Pryor
memorandum).
202. Consolidated 1, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
203. Id. at 1153.
204. See supra text accompanying note 173 (discussing the content of the 08i patent).
205. Consolidated 1, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1154.
206. Id. at 1154-59.
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B. The District Court's Memorandum Opinion"'7
Following the magistrate's ruling, the parties submitted objections
to her findings and conclusions and presented oral arguments before
Judge Hubert L. Will of the Northern District of Illinois."0 8 Judge
Will reviewed the magistrate's findings and came to a vastly differ-
ent conclusion. He concluded that Consolidated's failure to disclose
the best mode in the 917 patent not only rendered that patent inva-
lid,209 but also constituted inequitable conduct.210
Judge Will cited a line of cases in which inequitable conduct and
fraud in one patent formed the basis for invalidating related patents.
He cited Precision Instruments Manufacturing v. Automotive
Maintenance Machinery Corp., in which the Supreme Court in-
validated two patents for failure to disclose perjury related to pro-
curing each of the patents.212 Judge Will also cited Hemstreet v.
Burroughs Corp.,21 3 where a district court invalidated two patents
that were continuations of the same inequitably prosecuted parent
207. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 716 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ill. 1989)
(Consolidated II).
208. The case was transferred to Judge Will after all of the briefs had been submitted. Attor-
neys for the parties were not informed of this transfer until they appeared for oral arguments
before Judge Williams. Judge Will's only contact with the case occurred after the extensive dis-
covery and trial before Magistrate Bucklo and Judge Williams. Appellants Brief at 4, Consoli-
dated 11, 716 F. Supp. 316 (Nos. 89-1637 to 89-1643).
209. Consolidated challenged the magistrate's finding equating (without citation) a failure to
disclose best mode with inequitable conduct. Consolidated 11, 716 F. Supp. at 323. In response,
Judge Will could produce just two cases in which failure to disclose the best mode arguably was
equated with inequitable conduct. Id. The first case was Steierman v. Connelly & Hares, 192
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 433 (Bd. Pat. Int. 1975), modified on other grounds, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 466
(Bd. Pat. Int. 1976), at that time a fourteen-year-old board of appeals case with no precedential
effect on the court. The Steierman court invalidated a single patent on the basis that the patentee
had concealed the best mode from the patent examiner. Id. at 437-38. The second case was Flick-
Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 241 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. 111. 1964), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 351 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966), in which the court
invalidated one of the patents-in-suit for failure to disclose the best mode and for withholding
prior art from the Patent Office. Neither Steierman nor Flick-Reedy involved infectious
unenforceability.
210. Consolidated II, 716 F. Supp. at 324-25 (citing Steierman, 716 F. Supp. at 437-38, and
Flick-Reedy, 241 F. Supp. at 140-41). In Flick-Reedy, the patentee had intentionally failed to
disclose a special tool for operating a seal for hydraulic and pneumatic cylinders. The district
court held that the failure to disclose the best mode, the special tool, constituted inequitable con-
duct. Flick-Reedy, 241 F. Supp. at 140-41.
211. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
212. Consolidated 11, 716 F. Supp. at 326 (citing Precision Instruments, 324 U.S. at 818-19);
see supra text accompanying notes 110-14 (discussing the Precision Instruments decision).
213. 666 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. II1. 1987).
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application. 214 In Hemstreet, the court found that the undisclosed
prior art was highly material to the claims of both of the patents-in-
suit, that the patentee knew of the materiality of the prior art, and
that he failed to call it to the attention of the Patent Office. "15 This
failure to disclose constituted inequitable conduct rendering both of
the patents unenforceable. 16
Judge Will also distinguished the facts in Consolidated II from
those in SSIH Equipment S.A. v. United States International
Trade Commission."7 In SSIH Equipment, the accused infringer
sought to have the court refuse to enforce one patent-in-suit, argu-
ing that it was so interrelated to two commonly owned, inequitably-
acquired patents that the patentee's unclean hands rendered the
third patent unenforceable. 1 8
Judge Will noted that the SSIH Equipment court refused to
strike down the patent-in-suit, noting that the acts forming the basis
for inequitable conduct had occurred after the patent-in-suit had is-
sued, almost three years before the other patents were applied for.2 19
The judge also cited the absence of a sufficient relationship between
the patent-in-suit and the inequitable conduct in the related pat-
ents.22 He reasoned that Keystone Driller and its progeny would
deny enforcement of the third patent only if the patentee were to
have committed a fraud on the Commission itself.221 Judge Will
stated that, unlike the facts in the present case, the SSIH Equip-
ment court "had only to decide 'whether or not the inequitable con-
duct with respect to the two subsequently obtained patents affected
the earlier patent. A significant relationship did not exist between
[the patents], and the inequitable conduct was isolated -' 222
Judge Will also attempted to distinguish Saxton Products, Inc. v.
United States Telephone Co.,2 23 in which the court flatly stated:
214. Consolidated II, 716 F. Supp. at 327 (citing Hemstreet, 666 F. Supp. at 1125-26); see
supra text accompanying notes 136-40 (discussing the Hemstreet decision).
215. Hernstreet, 666 F. Supp. at 1107.
216. Id.
217. Consolidated II, 716 F. Supp. at 328 (distinguishing SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States
Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
218. SSIH Equip. S.A. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 378 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
219. Consolidated II, 716 F. Supp. at 328.
220. Id.
221. Id. (citing SSIH Equip., 718 F.2d at 378-79).
222. Id.
223. 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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Fraud in obtaining one patent will not invalidate or render unenforceable
another patent in common ownership even where the two patents cover re-
lated subject matter, for example one being generic and covering an im-
provement within the scope of the first.22 '
Judge Will attacked Saxton Products, stating that if interpreted
broadly, the court's conclusion therein is "clearly contrary to the
Supreme Court's holdings in Keystone Driller and Precision Instru-
ments. ' '225 He also questioned the Saxton Product court's reliance
on Noll v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co.,226 which was, in his view, di-
rected to patent misuse, not inequitable conduct.227
The judge next distinguished the facts in Consolidated II from
those in Procter & Gamble Co. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc.,228 a case
used by Consolidated to support its argument that the patents in
Consolidated II were not sufficiently related to cause blanket unen-
forceability. 229 Although the patents were directed to the same sub-
ject matter,230 the Procter & Gamble court found that the patents
were mutually independent, stating that "whether [one of the first
patents] is unenforceable or not has little bearing on what it
teaches. The independent source of an additional method of produc-
tion [in the third patent] makes any 'connection' extremely
attenuated."23'
Judge Will construed this case as recognizing that the issue is
whether or not the patents have a significant relationship and how
that relationship is affected by inequitable conduct. He noted that
the Procter & Gamble court merely held that "the relationship was
insignificant. 23 2
The court then reiterated the magistrate's findings with respect to
the 917 patent, 283 holding that when Consolidated applied for the
improvements to the 917 patent, as represented by the 212, 081, and
303 patents, it should have disclosed to the Patent Office that the
224. Id. at 609 (citing Noll v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co., 467 F.2d 295 (6th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 965 (1973)).
225. Consolidated 11, 716 F. Supp. at 320.
226. 467 F.2d 295 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 965 (1973).
227. Consolidated 11, 716 F. Supp. at 320.
228. 697 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Del. 1988).
229. Consolidated 11, 716 F. Supp. at 321.
230. Procter & Gamble, 697 F. Supp. at 1364-65.
231. Id. at 1363.
232. Consolidated II 716 F. Supp. at 329-30.
233. Id. at 330-31.
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917 best mode had been concealed.234 Judge Will reasoned:
Such an admission would not have negated Consolidated's previous inequita-
ble conduct, but might have reduced the effect of such conduct on Consoli-
dated's subsequent patent applications. It would have given the patent ex-
aminer a sufficient opportunity to compare Consolidated's patent
applications with the prior art and would have evidenced an intent to deal
with the Patent Office in good faith. It certainly is information which we
believe the patent examiner would have deemed material. Thus, the failure
to disclose prior inequitable conduct during later patent applications was
itself inequitable conduct.2 35
The district court viewed Consolidated's failure to disclose the
concealment of the 917 best mode in the subsequent patents as a
link between the inequitable conduct in the 917 patent and the 081,
212, and 303 patents. In the court's opinion, this link established a
sufficient relationship between the 917 patent and the subsequent
patents to render the 081, 212, and 303 patents unenforceable due
to Consolidated's inequitable conduct in procuring the 917 patent.236
The district court affirmed the magistrate's finding that the re-
maining two patents were invalid because of the prior art.237 In ad-
dition, the court reversed the magistrate's finding that certain claims
of the patents were valid and infringed. 38 Finally, the court af-
firmed the magistrate's denial of Foseco's antitrust counterclaims. 9
C. The Federal Circuit Decision240
In the words of the Federal Circuit, Consolidated's appeal "re-
present[ed] the first instance in which [the Federal Circuit] was re-
quired to consider the equitable maxim that 'he who comes into eq-
uity must come with clean hands' in determining whether
234. Id. at 331.
235. Id. This finding is in stark contrast to the magistrate's finding on the materiality of the
disclosures in the 917 patent. The magistrate found that even if the information contained in the
363 patent, the "undisclosed best mode" of the 917 patent, were available as prior art against the
081 patent, it "would not affect the validity" of the 081 claims. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v.
Foseco Int'l Ltd., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1143, 1154 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Since the subject matter of
the 081 patent was most closely related to that of the 917 patent, this finding would logically
apply equally to the 212 and 303 patents. See infra notes 270-83 and accompanying text (analyz-
ing this issue in detail).
236. Consolidated II, 716 F. Supp. at 331-33.
237. Id. at 333-36.
238. Id. at 335.
239. Id.
240. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Con-
solidated III).
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inequitable conduct in procuring one patent-in-suit requires a hold-
ing that other patents-in-suit are unenforceable. '4 1 In analyzing
this issue, the Federal Circuit, like the district court, used as persua-
sive support the decisions in Keystone Driller Co. v. General Exca-
vator Co.,2 42 where the Supreme Court upheld a Sixth Circuit rul-
ing that all five patents-in-suit were unenforceable due to unclean
hands, and in Precision Instruments Manufacturing Co. v. Automo-
tive Maintenance Machinery Co., 243 in which the Supreme Court
dismissed an infringement suit on the grounds that the patentee ob-
tained the patents through perjury.
The Federal Circuit rejected Consolidated's argument that the
facts of the subject case were distinguishable from those in Keystone
Driller. Consolidated argued that the only relationship between the
patents-in-suit was one of subject matter, and that "mere related-
ness of subject matter" was not a proper basis for applying the un-
clean hands doctrine.24
However, the Federal Circuit viewed the prosecution histories of
the patents-in-suit as establishing an "immediate and necessary re-
lation" between Consolidated's inequitable conduct in prosecuting
the 917 patent and the equity that Consolidated sought, namely the
enforcement of the 081, 212, and 303 patents.24 5 Writing for the
court, Chief Judge Howard Markey cited two paragraphs from the
081 prosecution history discussing the CS1-B slurry.246 Extrapolat-
241. Id. at 809.
242. 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
243. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
244. Consolidated 111, 910 F.2d at 810.
245. Id. at 810-11.
246. Id. at 811-12. The quoted paragraphs are as follows:
It is also urged that the obtainment of key characteristics defined in the instant
specification is dependent upon the manner of preparing the filter. This is discussed in
some detail in the instant specification, see pages 9 through 14 thereof [discussing the
CSI-B slurry], which is clearly not inherently contemplated by the 917 patent. ...
The data set forth in the Examples which form a part of the instant specification
are believed to be particularly'surprising. See, for example, Table I [results using the
CSI1-B slurry] which shows a remarkable improvement obtained in accordance with
the present invention of both unfiltered metal and metal filtered through a tabular
alumina bed. The other Examples are to the same effect. It is vigorously argued that
one skilled in the art would not anticipate such significantly improved results from the
917 patent. The key interrelationship of operating variables is believed to be sug-
gested in the instant specification and not in the art.
Id.
The 081 specification fully disclosed the use of a slurry containing Bentonite, but made it clear
that "one could use a chemical equivalent or approximate the composition of this material." U.S.
Patent No. 3,962,081, col. 5, 11. 64-66.
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ing from these two paragraphs, he then concluded that the CS1-B
slurry was "critical" to the 081 invention.247 The opinion relegated
Magistrate Bucklo's express finding to the contrary to a cryptic
footnote, stating:
The special master was of the view that the 081, 212, and 303 patents would
have been valid even if the CS1-B slurry were in the prior art. However that
may be, we need not pause to consider the accuracy of that view, for the
issue is enforceability, not validity.""
The Federal Circuit admitted that the 212 and 303 applications
did not contain such arguments but held that since these applica-
tions were continuations-in-part of the 081 application, they too
were tainted.2" 9 The court's position was that the cited paragraphs
were evidence that Consolidated "made arguments [in the 081 ap-
plication] that it could not have made had it not concealed" the
slurry, and therefore its conduct "permeated the prosecution of the
other patents-in-suit," rendering them unenforceable.25
Consolidated argued that in SSIH Equipment S.A. v. United
States International Trade Commission,"1 the Federal Circuit had
required "fraud before the court" for the unclean hands doctrine to
apply.252 Judge Markey dismissed this argument as taking a state-
ment from SSIH Equipment "out of context."2 53 Quoting Keystone
Driller, Judge Markey stated that "[u]nclean hands is not bound by
formula or restrained by any limitation that tends to trammel the
free and just exercise of discretion."254 The Federal Circuit thus af-
firmed the decision of the district court.2 55
III. ANALYSIS
The Federal Circuit's opinion in Consolidated III ignores the lack
247. Consolidated 11I, 910 F.2d at 812.
248. Id. at 812 n.8 (citations omitted).
249. Id. at 812.
250. Id.
251. 718 F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
252. Consolidated I, 910 F.2d at 812.
253. Id. The Federal Circuit noted that, unlike Consolidated's patents, the alleged inequitable
conduct in SSIH Equipment occurred in the prosecution of patents not in suit, which had issued
three years before the conduct occurred. The Federal Circuit further stated that "Consolidated's
reading of SSIH would be at odds with Precision Instruments, which held that withholding infor-
mation from the PTO so soiled the patentee's hands as to render all patents-in-suit unenforce-
able." Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 815.
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of any basis for Judge Will's rejection of the magistrate's report.
The court did not explain or adopt Judge Will's reasoning, which
was based on a "broad pattern of inequitable conduct," as well as on
Consolidated's failure to tell the Patent Office that the best mode
was missing from the 917 patent. 256 Rather, the Federal Circuit at-
tempted to craft its own rationale for applying infectious unenforce-
ability to the patents-in-suit by linking the subsequent patents to the
CS1-B slurry. Analysis of the court's opinion must begin with an
examination of the specific acts that were held to constitute inequi-
table conduct.
It is beyond question that the inventors failed to disclose the CS1-
B slurry in the 917 patent. Since the magistrate found that the CS1-
B slurry constituted the best mode of practicing the 917 invention, it
follows that the 917 patent was invalid for failure to disclose the
best mode as required by patent law. 57 In addition, accepting argu-
endo that intentional concealment of the best mode constitutes ineq-
uitable conduct, the claims of the 917 patent would also be
unenforceable.
It is also beyond question that Consolidated disclosed the CS1-B
slurry in the 081, 212, and 303 patents. However, during prosecu-
tion of these later patents, Consolidated did not inform the Patent
Office of its failure to disclose the best mode during prosecution of
the 917 patent. 5 8
Within this factual context, it is clear that the relationship be-
tween the 917 patent and the later patents was insufficient to render
the later patents unenforceable. Furthermore, under the then ex-
isting (and current) case law, the withholding of the best mode in
the 917 patent could not serve as an independent basis for finding
inequitable conduct with respect to the later patents.
256. Judge Will's opinion stated, without citation, that Consolidated had a duty to inform the
patent office, during prosecution of subsequent patents with different inventors, that the best mode
had not been disclosed in the 917 patent. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 716
F. Supp. 316, 331 (N.D. III. 1989) (Consolidated 11); see also supra text accompanying notes
234-36 (discussing Judge Will's reasoning on the duty to inform). This raises the rather Byzantine
question of whether nondisclosure of a failure to disclose the best mode of a previous application
constitutes inequitable conduct in a subsequent application. The Federal Circuit, perhaps wisely
avoiding a discussion of "how many angels can dance on the head of a pin," did not address this
point. This Note will similarly avoid this point.
257. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (explaining the requirements of 35 U.S.C. §
112 (1988) with regard to disclosing best mode).




A. The Relationship between the Patents
In all of the previous cases using inequitable conduct to render
related patents unenforceable, the patents had a genealogical rela-
tionship,259 or there existed a "causal connection between the valid-
ity of the patents."2 60 In the former cases, such as Hemstreet v.
Burroughs Corp.,26' the patents were mutually dependent by virtue
of having common inventors or common disclosures. For example, in
Hemstreet the patents-in-suit issued from a common parent applica-
tion. The reference withheld from the Patent Office was highly ma-
terial to the subject matter of the parent application, and thus
equally material to both of the divisional patents. 62
In such cases, it is virtually impossible to separate the soup from
the poison. Since the claims of each of the genealogically related
patents are based upon common disclosures, inequitable conduct
that would taint the very basis of one of the patents would be likely
to taint each of the related patents. In such instances, all of the
related patents stand or fall together.
In contrast to Hemstreet, where the court invalidated patents on
the basis of genealogical relationship, the Supreme Court used the
"causal connection" theory to invalidate patents in Keystone Driller
Co. v. General Excavator Co.2 16 and Precision Instruments Manu-
facturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co.21" In Key-
stone Driller, the Supreme Court defined the scope of the unclean
hands doctrine, holding that it would apply "only where some un-
conscionable act of one coming for relief has immediate and neces-
sary relation to the equity that he seeks in respect of the matter in
litigation. ' 265 Applying the doctrine to the facts in Keystone Driller,
the Court invalidated several related patents, reasoning that four of
the five patents-in-suit were improvements on the patented subject
matter of the first patent. The patentee concealed a prior use that
would have invalidated one of the improvement patents and, after
bringing suit to enforce all five of the patents, conspired to suppress
259. See supra note 141 (discussing the concept of a genealogical relationship among patents).
260. Boots Labs., Inc. v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 840, 849-50 (E.D.
Va. 1984); see supra text accompanying notes 129-33 (discussing the Boots Labs. decision).
261. 666 F. Supp. 1096 (N.D. III. 1987).
262. Id. at 1107.
263. 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
264. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
265. Keystone Driller, 290 U.S. at 245.
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evidence of the prior use from the trial court.268 It was the paten-
tee's conduct before the court in enforcing all of the patents, rather
than the concealed prior art in prosecuting one of the patents, that
formed the basis for unenforceability.267
In Precision Instruments, the inventor submitted a false affidavit
to prevail in an interference proceeding, thereby obtaining a pat-
ent.26 The assignee of the patent subsequently brought suit on the
perjured patent and two others, notwithstanding the fact that it had
discovered the inventor's perjured affidavit. Stating that the history
of the patents in issue was "steeped in perjury and the undisclosed
knowledge of perjury, ' 2 9 the Supreme Court followed the precedent
of Keystone Driller and dismissed the entire patent infringement
suit under the unclean hands doctrine.2
In both Keystone Driller and Precision Instruments, the conduct
of the patentees before the court had an immediate impact on all of
the patents-in-suit. In both, the patentees' misrepresentations before
the court were so egregious that even when viewed independently,
each of the patents in these cases would have fallen on its own
merits.
In contrast to the patents in Hemstreet, none of the "tainted"
patents procured by Consolidated had a genealogical relationship
with the 917 patent. There were no common inventors, no com-
monly claimed subject matter, no co-pendency, and no claims of pri-
ority for filing dates.27'
Furthermore, there was no "causal relationship" between the fail-
ure to disclose the best mode in the 917 patent and the issuance of
the later patents. The missing best mode in the 917 patent, the CS1-
B slurry, was fully disclosed in each of the later patents. In the 917
patent, Dr. Pryor was concerned with the broad concept of using a
slurry to produce a ceramic foam filter. In the subsequent patents,
Dore and his associates were concerned with methods and apparatus
for producing ceramic foam filters independent of the slurry used.
The 081 patent is directed to ceramic filters having pore blockages
that make molten metal travel a tortuous path through the filter.
These pore blockages are obtained through the rolling process and
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Precision Instruments, 324 U.S. at 816.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 819.
271. See supra notes 148-62 (detailing the evolution of Consolidated's patents).
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are not related to the slurry used to make the filter. The 081 specifi-
cation fully discloses the use of a slurry containing Bentonite, but
makes it clear that "one could use a chemical equivalent or approxi-
mate the composition of this material. 2
In his opinion, Judge Markey quoted from the prosecution history
of the 081 patent to establish the relationship between the 917 pat-
ent and the 081, 212, and 303 patents.27 '3 The bracketing in the
quoted passages makes it appear as though the arguments were di-
rected to the CS1-B slurry formula. However, the first cited passage
refers to portions of the 081 patent specification that describe the
overall process by which the filter is made.274 The second cited pas-
sage refers to a table comparing the performance of known filters to
a ceramic foam filter made with this process. 75 This process was
later claimed in the 212 and 303 patents but was not known at the
time of the filing of the 917 patent.
Contrary to the Federal Circuit's assertion, the cited arguments
could certainly have been made if the CS1-B slurry had been dis-
closed, since the arguments in no way rely upon the constitution of
the slurry itself. This conclusion is supported by the magistrate's
finding that even if the slurry formula was disclosed in the 363 pat-
ent, and the "undisclosed best mode" of the 917 patent was availa-
ble as prior art against the 081 patent, it "would not affect the va-
lidity" of the 081 claims. 76
The 212 patent added improvements to the processes disclosed in
the 081 patent and was therefore a continuation-in-part of the 081
patent. The 303 patent added additional improvements and was a
continuation-in-part of the 212 patent. The improvements added by
the 212 and 303 patents represented further refinements and con-
ceptual developments of the 081 pore blockage concept, taking the
ceramic foam filter concept even further away from the broad dis-
closure of the 917 patent than did the improvement of the 081
patent.
272. U.S. Patent No. 3,962,081, col. 5, 11. 64-66.
273. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 811-12 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(Consolidated III).
274. U.S. Patent No. 3,962,081, col. 5, 1. 7 through col. 8, I. 42; see supra note 246 (quoting
passages from the 081 patent application).
275. U.S. Patent No. 3,962,081, col. 10, II. 38-45; see supra note 246 (quoting passages from
the 081 patent application).
276. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1143, 1154
(N.D. Il1. 1988) (Consolidated I).
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Thus, since the 212 and 303 patents were even less related to the
917 patent than was the 081 patent, it follows that the magistrate's
finding with respect to the 081 patent would logically apply to the
212 and 303 patents as well. As with the 081 patent, the validity of
these patents would not be affected if the CS1-B slurry was availa-
ble as prior art.
Furthermore, since the validity of Consolidated's patents would
not be affected if the CS1-B slurry had been available as prior art,
these patents, like the patents at issue in Procter & Gamble Co. v.
Nabisco Brands,2 77 were "mutually independent. 21 7 8 There was no
"causal connection" between the validity of the Consolidated's pat-
ents-in-suit.
The patents here were related only by virtue of common owner-
ship, incorporation by reference, and related subject matter. The
same relationships existed among the patents in Procter & Gamble
Co. v. Nabisco Brands,279 Boots Laboratories, Inc. v. Burroughs
Wellcome Co.,28 0 and SSIH Equipment S.A. v. United States Inter-
national Trade Commission.28 1 Despite common ownership and in-
corporation by reference, in each of these cases the courts refused to
apply the unclean hands doctrine to extend unenforceability to the
patents-in-suit.8 2 The relationship between the patents in Consoli-
dated is similar to that of the patents in Procter & Gamble, where
the court found that such a relationship established "at best, a tenu-
ous connection. '28 3
The only other basis for rendering the later patents unenforceable
was the relationship of their subject matter to the 917 patent. How-
ever, this basis was specifically rejected by the Federal Circuit in
SSIH Equipment."4 In sum, there was no genealogical relationship
277. 697 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Del. 1988).
278. See id. at 1363 (discussing the basis for holding that the patents were mutually indepen-
dent); see also supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text (discussing the Procter & Gamble
case).
279. 697 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Del. 1988).
280. 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 840 (E.D. Va. 1984).
281. 718 F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 122-35 (discussing the facts in Procter & Gamble and
Boots Laboratories).
283. Procter & Gamble, 697 F. Supp. at 1365.
284. SSIH Equip., 718 F.2d at 378. The court held that:
"inequitable conduct" is said to arise from a failure on the part of [the patentee] to
inform the patent examiner of certain acts alleged to constitute a possible on-sale bar
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) to all but the 762 patent. This inequitable conduct is not
said to have occurred in connection with the procurement of the 762 patent. Rather,
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between the 917 patent and the subsequent Consolidated patents,
and there was no causal relationship between the inequitable con-
duct in the 917 patent and the conduct surrounding subsequent pat-
ents. Accordingly, there was not a sufficient connection between the
917 patent and the later patents to render the later patents
unenforceable.
B. Independent Basis for Finding Inequitable Conduct
Absent either a genealogical relationship or causal connection be-
tween the patents, the only remaining basis for the court to invali-
date all of the patents-in-suit is that the failure to disclose the best
mode of the 917 patent must have formed an independent basis for
inequitable conduct with respect to the 081, 212, and 303 patents.
In order for this basis to apply, the tests for materiality and intent
set forth in J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd.285 must be met.
In Consolidated I, the magistrate found that both the withholding
of the best mode and the inclusion of a fictitious slurry in the 917
patent were intentional." 6 However, the CS1-B slurry was disclosed
in the 081, 212, and 303 patents.
It is remarkable that the Federal Circuit relegated the magis-
trate's finding on the effect of the CS1-B slurry, had it been availa-
ble as prior art against the later Consolidated patents, to a mere
footnote. The court's observation that "the issue is enforceability,
not validity ' 2 87 was true. However, the issue of enforceability hinges
on the issue of inequitable conduct, which must be based upon a
finding of materiality.2 8 The question at the core of materiality is
what effect, if any, the withheld information would have had on the
examiner in determining patentability of the claims.28 9 The magis-
[the accused infringer] relies solely on the supposition that all of the patents are so
interrelated that [the patentee's] "unclean hands" with respect to the later patents
renders the 762 patent unenforceable. We reject this contention as a matter of law.
Id.
285. 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985), overruled
by Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989); see supra notes 51-96 and accompanying text (discussing the
threshold levels of materiality and intent needed to establish inequitable conduct).
286. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1143, 1153
(N.D. 111. 1988) (Consolidated I).
287. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 812 n.8 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (Consolidated 111).




trate found that the CS1-B slurry (had it been in the prior art)
would have had no effect on the claims of the later patents. 90 If a
prior art reference would have no effect on the claims, it would have
no effect on whether or not an examiner would allow those claims.
Thus, the magistrate's finding not only bears upon the question of
materiality, it answers it. Unlike the Federal Circuit, which stated
that it "need not pause to consider ' 291 this finding, this Note will
proceed to consider its effect in detail.
Examination of the magistrate's finding reveals that none of the
four tests for materiality applies to Consolidated's patents-in-suit.29 2
The first test, the objective "but for" test, is satisfied when the mis-
representation was so material that, but for the misrepresentation,
the patent not only would not have been issued, but should not have
been issued.293 Since the CS1-B slurry would have had no effect on
the validity of the 081 patent or, by implication, the validity of the
212 and 303 patents, the issuance of the later patents would not
have been affected by disclosure of the CS1-B slurry. The magis-
trate's findings therefore preclude the application of this test.
The magistrate's findings similarly preclude application of the
second test, the subjective "but for" test, which asks whether the
misrepresentation caused the examiner to approve the application
when he would not otherwise have done so. 294 The examiner could
not have been induced to allow an application by an applicant's fail-
ure to disclose information art that would not affect the validity of
the claims.
The same result holds for the third test, the "but it may have
been" test, which requires that the misrepresentation in the course
of the patent prosecution might have influenced the examiner.2 95 It
is impossible that information having no effect on the claims would
290. Consolidated 1, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154.
291. Consolidated 111, 910 F.2d at 812 n.8.
292. See supra notes 51- /9 and accompanying text (explaining the underpinnings of all four
tests for materiality).
293. Swift Chem. Co. v. Usamex Fertilizers, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 10, 29 (E.D. La.
1977); Corning Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F.Supp. 461, 469 (D. Del.
1966), modified on other grounds, 374 F.2d 473 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 826
(1967); see supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing the objective "but for" test).
294. American Cyanamid Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966); Water-
man-Bic Pen Corp. v. W.A. Sheaffer Pen Co., 267 F. Supp. 849, 856 (D. Del. 1967); see supra
notes 57-61 and accompanying text (discussing the subjective "but for" test).
295. Corning Glass Works, 253 F. Supp. at 469; see supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text
(discussing the "but it might have been" test).
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have any influence on the examiner, whether it had been disclosed
or not.
The fourth test, the PTO Rule 1.56(a) test, " ' requires anyone
who is "substantially involved" in preparing or prosecuting a patent
application to disclose to the Patent Office any information that is
"material to the examination of the application. 2 97 Such informa-
tion is material where there is "a substantial likelihood that a rea-
sonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to
allow the application to issue as a patent. ' 298 Under this standard, a
reference that would have been merely cumulative, teaching no
more than those references already considered by the examiner,
would not be material. 99
The magistrate in Consolidated I found that the validity of the
081 patent (and, by implication, the 212 and 303 patents) would not
have been affected if the CS1-B slurry had been available as prior
art.300 The claims of these patents in no way relied upon the partic-
ular slurry formulation. Since the CS1-B slurry would have no ef-
fect on the validity of the claims, there is no likelihood that a rea-
sonable patent examiner would have considered the CS1-B slurry to
be important in deciding whether to allow the subsequent patents.
The magistrate's findings further indicate that the CS1-B.slurry was
not material to the 081, 212, or 303 patents, and thus negate all
four of the J.P. Stevens tests as applied to the 081, 212, and 303
patents.
Absent a finding of materiality, the question of intent is moot.3"1
However, Consolidated did in fact disclose the CS1-B slurry in the
later patents. This disclosure indicates that there was no deception,
thus precluding a finding that there was any intent to deceive.
The inequitable conduct with respect to the 917 patent was not
material to either obtaining or enforcing the 081, 212, and 303 pat-
ents. The Federal Circuit in Consolidated III struck down subse-
296. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1991), superseded by C.F.R. § 156 (1992); see Adamo, supra note
70, at 110 (discussing the evolution of tests for materiality); see also supra notes 69-78 and ac-
companying text (discussing the substantial likelihood test embodied in PTO Rule 1.56).
297. See Adamo, supra note 70, at 110.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1143, 1154
(N.D. II1. 1988) (Consolidated 1).
301. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd. (Fed. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
822 (1985), overruled by Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867
(Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
1992]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
quent patents whose only connection with the 917 patents was relat-
edness of subject matter, an action that was without precedent. It
contravened Procter & Gamble Co. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc.,302
where the district court stated that it had
serious reservations about whether one patent could ever incorporate, along
with the teachings of another patent, the inequitable conduct associated
with another patent. Even if the incorporated patent is ultimately unenforce-
able, the teachings of that patent are still available as information within
the public domain. Subsequent inventors should be able to rely on those
teachings without having to worry about incorporating the misdeeds under-
lying the incorporated patent's unenforceability.303
Faced with a similar situation, the Federal Circuit had no such
reservations.
IV. IMPACT
The incentives and benefits of the U.S. patent system are so well-
established as to be axiomatic. Regarding the constitutional estab-
lishment of the patent system,304 James Madison stated that "[t]he
utility of this clause will scarcely be questioned. 30 5
By penalizing subsequent inventors for the sins of their predeces-
sors, the Federal Circuit's holding in Consolidated III strikes a seri-
ous blow to each of these venerable benefits. The decision discour-
ages inventors from working in technologies related to an
unenforceable patent by removing the incentive of obtaining related
"improvement" patents. A patent grant is "the reward stipulated for
the advantages derived by the public for the exertions of the individ-
ual, and is intended as a stimulus to those exertions."30 6 Why should
an inventor invest his time and effort in furthering a specific inven-
tion if the reward is a "tainted" patent?
Furthermore, the decision discourages companies from filing ap-
plications in fields related to an invalidated patent since it calls into
question the validity of any patent issued in a similar technology.
When taken to its logical conclusion, the court's reasoning effec-
tively prevents a company from ever again obtaining a valid patent
in any technology relating to an original, tainted patent.
302. 697 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Del. 1988).
303. Id. at 1363.
304. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that the purpose of the patent system is "[t]o pro-
mote the progress of science and the useful arts").
305. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 23, at 271.
306. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 242 (1832).
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The ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs
and technologies into the public domain through disclosure.3 07 The
attractiveness of such a bargain, and its effectiveness in inducing
creative effort and disclosure of the results of that effort, depend
almost entirely on the backdrop of free competition in the exploita-
tion of inventions that are unpatented, or in the public domain after
expiration of a patent. 30 8
Writing in 1890, Professor Robinson succinctly described the es-
sence of the patent system, stating:
[T]he granting of a patent privilege at once accomplishes three important
objects; it rewards the inventor for his skill and labor in conceiving and
perfecting his invention; it stimulates him, as well as others, to still further
efforts in the same or different fields; it secures to the public an immediate
knowledge of the character and scope of his invention, and an unrestricted
right to use it after it has expired. 09
The message of Consolidated III is that companies and inventors
would be better served by keeping their developments as trade
secrets rather than risk losing an entire patent portfolio. Without
public disclosure, an invention cannot "stimulate others to still fur-
ther efforts in the same or different fields," nor can a secret inven-
tion "secure to the public an immediate knowledge of the character
and scope" of the invention, or "an unrestricted right to use it after
it has expired."3 10
Furthermore, since patent practitioners risk the loss of their regis-
tration to practice before the Patent Office for engaging in inequita-
ble conduct, the decision puts patent counsel into a strange, almost
adversarial position, in which they must constantly probe their cli-
ents as to whether they have-disclosed the best mode, not only in a
proposed or pending application, but also in any preceding related
patent. This applies not only to the immediate inventors, but also to
their forerunners in the field as well. It is difficult to imagine a situ-
ation in which inventors would even have access to such informa-
tion. Under the rationale of Consolidated III, they use the patent
system at their peril.
307. Id.
308. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
309. 1 ROBINSON, supra note 31, § 33.
310. 1 id.
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CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's decision in Consolidated III runs contrary
to its own precedent, which requires a clear relationship between
patents-in-suit as a prerequisite for infectious unenforceability. The
decision is without basis in that it fails to establish, in any credible
way, a connection between the "tainted" patent-in-suit and the sub-
sequent patents. Moreover, the decision is against public policy be-
cause it chills the incentive for others in the same company, perhaps
even in the same industry, to expand on ideas contained in a poten-
tially tainted patent.
The principles of this case have the potential for removing, or se-
verely limiting, incentives that form the very basis of the patent sys-
tem, thereby depriving the public of the benefits of disclosure. Un-
less limited by future decisions, or wisely ignored, Consolidated III
will have a decidedly negative effect on the patent system.
Patrick N. Burkhart
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